Plain
Marcus Aurelius — The Emperor

Nothing should be considered part of what makes a man truly a man unless it actually belongs to human nature itself. The outcomes of our plans are not requirements for being human. Human nature doesn't promise such things. The final results of our actions have nothing to do with what we are as people. Therefore, the purpose of a human life — the highest good that fulfills that purpose — cannot depend on achieving the outcomes we planned and intended.

Meditations, Book 5, Section 14 Book 5 · 26 of 52
Freedom & Control What Matters Most
Marcus Aurelius — The Emperor Original

Nothing must be thought to belong to a man, which doth not belong unto him as he is a man. These, the event of purposes, are not things required in a man. The nature of man doth not profess any such things. The final ends and consummations of actions are nothing at all to a man's nature. The end therefore of a man, or the _summum bonum_ whereby that end is fulfilled, cannot consist in the consummation of actions purposed and intended.

Meditations, Book 5, Section 14 Book 5 · 26 of 52
Marcus Aurelius — The Emperor

Reason and rational power are abilities that are complete in themselves. They drive their own actions. They start moving on their own. But they always aim straight toward whatever goal lies ahead of them. They go toward what can actually be done, whether or not it was their original target. This is why such actions are called 'straight achievements' — because they follow the most direct path.

Meditations, Book 5, Section 14 Book 5 · 25 of 52
Knowing Yourself Freedom & Control
Marcus Aurelius — The Emperor Original

Reason, and rational power, are faculties which content themselves with themselves, and their own proper operations. And as for their first inclination and motion, that they take from themselves. But their progress is right to the end and object, which is in their way, as it were, and lieth just before them: that is, which is feasible and possible, whether it be that which at the first they proposed to themselves, or no. For which reason also such actions are termed κατορθώσεις, to intimate the directness of the way, by which they are achieved.

Meditations, Book 5, Section 14 Book 5 · 25 of 52
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Ancient philosophy, in plain English.

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