Plain
Seneca — The Senator

My first book, Novatus, had richer material to work with. It's like rolling a cart downhill — easy. Now we must tackle drier ground. The question before us is this: does anger come from deliberate choice or from impulse? In other words, does it act on its own, or is it like most passions that spring up inside us without our knowing?

On Anger, Book 2, Section 1 Book 2 · 1 of 103
Human Nature Knowing Yourself
Seneca — The Senator Original

My first book, Novatus, had a more abundant subject: for carriages roll easily down hill:[1] now we must proceed to drier matters. The question before us is whether anger arises from deliberate choice or from impulse, that is, whether it acts of its own accord or like the greater part of those passions which spring up within us without our knowledge.

On Anger, Book 2, Section 1 Book 2 · 1 of 103
Seneca — The Senator

He would think that lust shows greatness of mind: the lustful man swims across dangerous waters, castrates groups of young men, and puts himself within reach of angry husbands' swords with complete contempt for death. He would think ambition shows greatness of mind too: the ambitious man won't settle for holding office once a year. If he could, he would fill the entire calendar with his own name and cover the whole world with his titles. It doesn't matter how high or far these passions go. They are narrow, pitiful, and low. Only virtue is truly lofty and sublime. Nothing is truly great unless it is also peaceful.

On Anger, Book 1, Section 21 Book 1 · 69 of 69
Doing The Right Thing What Matters Most
Seneca — The Senator Original

He would think that lust shows greatness of mind: for the lustful man swims across straits, castrates troops of boys, and puts himself within reach of the swords of injured husbands with complete scorn of death. Ambition, too, he would think shows greatness of mind: for the ambitious man is not content with office once a year, but, if possible, would fill the calendar of dignities with his name alone, and cover the whole world with his titles. It matters nothing to what heights or lengths these passions may proceed: they are narrow, pitiable, grovelling. Virtue alone is lofty and sublime, nor is anything great which is not at the same time tranquil.

On Anger, Book 1, Section 21 Book 1 · 69 of 69
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Ancient philosophy, in plain English.

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