Plain
Epictetus — The Slave

You'll find this same dispute between Agamemnon and Achilles. Let's call them forward. What do you say, Agamemnon? Shouldn't you do what's proper and right? "Absolutely." Well, what do you say, Achilles? Don't you agree that you should do what's good? "I absolutely do." Then apply your basic beliefs to this specific situation. Here's where the dispute starts. Agamemnon says, "I shouldn't have to give Chryseis back to her father." Achilles says, "You should." Clearly one of them is misapplying the basic idea of "ought" or "duty." Then Agamemnon says, "Well, if I have to return Chryseis, then I should take someone else's prize from one of you." Achilles replies, "Would you really take the woman I love?" "Yes, the one you love." "So I'm the only one who goes without a prize? I'm the only one who gets nothing?" This is how the dispute begins.

Discourses, Against Those Who Wish to Be Admired 53 of 388
Doing The Right Thing Human Nature
Epictetus — The Slave Original

You will find this dispute also between Agamemnon and Achilles; for call them forth. What do you say, Agamemnon? ought not that to be done which is proper and right? "Certainly." Well, what do you say, Achilles? do you not admit that what is good ought to be done? "I do most certainly." Adapt your præcognitions then to the present matter. Here the dispute begins. Agamemnon says, "I ought not to give up Chryseis to her father." Achilles says, "You ought." It is certain that one of the two makes a wrong adaptation of the præcognition of "ought" or "duty." Further, Agamemnon says, "Then if I ought to restore Chryseis, it is fit that I take his prize from some of you." Achilles replies, "Would you then take her whom I love?" "Yes, her whom you love." "Must I then be the only man who goes without a prize? and must I be the only man who has no prize?" Thus the dispute begins.

Discourses, Against Those Who Wish to Be Admired 53 of 388
Epictetus — The Slave

We all share basic ideas about right and wrong. These basic ideas don't contradict each other. Who among us doesn't think that good things are helpful and worth choosing? Who doesn't think we should always follow and pursue what's good? Who doesn't think justice is noble and proper? So when do disagreements start? They start when we try to apply these basic ideas to specific situations. One person says, "He did the right thing. He's brave." Another says, "No, he acted like a fool." That's when people start arguing. This is what Jews, Syrians, Egyptians, and Romans argue about. They don't disagree that holiness matters most and should always be pursued. They disagree about whether eating pork is holy or unholy.

Discourses, Against Those Who Wish to Be Admired 52 of 388
Human Nature Doing The Right Thing
Epictetus — The Slave Original

ON PRÆCOGNITIONS.—Præcognitions are common to all men, and præcognition is not contradictory to præcognition. For who of us does not assume that Good is useful and eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought to follow and pursue it? And who of us does not assume that Justice is beautiful and becoming? When then does the contradiction arise? It arises in the adaptation of the præcognitions to the particular cases. When one man says, "He has done well; he is a brave man," and another says, "Not so; but he has acted foolishly," then the disputes arise among men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the Syrians and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness should be preferred to all things and in all cases should be pursued, but whether it is holy to eat pig's flesh or not holy.

Discourses, Against Those Who Wish to Be Admired 52 of 388
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Ancient philosophy, in plain English.

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