Discourses, Against Those Who Wish to Be Admired

Epictetus — The Slave

You'll find this same dispute between Agamemnon and Achilles. Let's call them forward. What do you say, Agamemnon? Shouldn't you do what's proper and right? "Absolutely." Well, what do you say, Achilles? Don't you agree that you should do what's good? "I absolutely do." Then apply your basic beliefs to this specific situation. Here's where the dispute starts. Agamemnon says, "I shouldn't have to give Chryseis back to her father." Achilles says, "You should." Clearly one of them is misapplying the basic idea of "ought" or "duty." Then Agamemnon says, "Well, if I have to return Chryseis, then I should take someone else's prize from one of you." Achilles replies, "Would you really take the woman I love?" "Yes, the one you love." "So I'm the only one who goes without a prize? I'm the only one who gets nothing?" This is how the dispute begins.

Epictetus — The Slave Original

You will find this dispute also between Agamemnon and Achilles; for call them forth. What do you say, Agamemnon? ought not that to be done which is proper and right? "Certainly." Well, what do you say, Achilles? do you not admit that what is good ought to be done? "I do most certainly." Adapt your præcognitions then to the present matter. Here the dispute begins. Agamemnon says, "I ought not to give up Chryseis to her father." Achilles says, "You ought." It is certain that one of the two makes a wrong adaptation of the præcognition of "ought" or "duty." Further, Agamemnon says, "Then if I ought to restore Chryseis, it is fit that I take his prize from some of you." Achilles replies, "Would you then take her whom I love?" "Yes, her whom you love." "Must I then be the only man who goes without a prize? and must I be the only man who has no prize?" Thus the dispute begins.