Plain
Epictetus — The Slave

How can we say that some outside things are natural and others unnatural? Think of it this way. If we were cut off from everyone else, we might say different things. Take a foot, for example. I might say it's natural for a foot to stay clean. But if you think of it as a foot that belongs to a body, then it should step in mud and walk on thorns when needed. Sometimes it should even be cut off to save the whole body. Otherwise, it's not really doing its job as a foot. We should think about ourselves the same way. What are you? A human being. If you think of yourself as separate from other people, then yes — it seems natural to live to old age, be rich, and stay healthy.

Discourses, How Magnanimity is Consistent with Care 107 of 388
Human Nature Knowing Yourself
Epictetus — The Slave Original

How then is it said that some external things are according to nature and others contrary to nature? It is said as it might be said if we were separated from union (or society): for to the foot I shall say that it is according to nature for it to be clean; but if you take it as a foot and as a thing not detached (independent), it will befit it both to step into the mud and tread on thorns, and sometimes to be cut off for the good of the whole body; otherwise it is no longer a foot. We should think in some such way about ourselves also. What are you? A man. If you consider yourself as detached from other men, it is according to nature to live to old age, to be rich, to be healthy.

Discourses, How Magnanimity is Consistent with Care 107 of 388
Epictetus — The Slave

If mixing care and firmness is impossible, then happiness is impossible. But we should act like we do when taking a voyage. What can I do? I can choose the ship's captain, the sailors, the day, and when to sail. Then a storm hits. What more should I worry about? I've done my part. The rest belongs to someone else — the captain. But the ship is sinking. What should I do then? I do the only thing I can: not drown full of fear, screaming, or blaming God. I know that what comes into being must also pass away. I'm not immortal. I'm just a person, part of the whole, like an hour is part of a day. I must be present like the hour, and pass away like the hour. What difference does it make how I die — whether I suffocate or get a fever? I have to die somehow.

Discourses, How Magnanimity is Consistent with Care 106 of 388
Freedom & Control Death & Mortality
Epictetus — The Slave Original

and if it is, happiness is impossible. But we should act as we do in the case of a voyage. What can I do? I can choose the master of the ship, the sailors, the day, the opportunity. Then comes a storm. What more have I to care for? for my part is done. The business belongs to another, the master. But the ship is sinking—what then have I to do? I do the only thing that I can, not to be drowned full of fear, nor screaming nor blaming God, but knowing that what has been produced must also perish: for I am not an immortal being, but a man, a part of the whole, as an hour is a part of the day: I must be present like the hour, and past like the hour. What difference then does it make to me how I pass away, whether by being suffocated or by a fever, for I must pass through some such means.

Discourses, How Magnanimity is Consistent with Care 106 of 388
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Ancient philosophy, in plain English.

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