Plain
Epictetus — The Slave

What are we looking at? Let's say pleasure. Put it to the test. Throw it on the scale. Should good things be the kind of things you can trust? Yes. Should you be able to rely on them? Yes. Should you trust anything that's unreliable? No. Is pleasure reliable? No. Then throw it out. Get it away from the good things. If you're not seeing clearly, or one test isn't enough, try another. Should good things make you feel proud? Yes. So should you feel proud about momentary pleasure? Think carefully before you answer. If you say yes, I won't even bother with the scale anymore. This is how you test things — when you have solid rules ready. Philosophy is about examining and confirming these rules. Using them once you know them — that's what wise and good people do.

Discourses, What the Beginning of Philosophy is 142 of 388
Knowing Yourself What Matters Most
Epictetus — The Slave Original

What is the matter presented to us about which we are inquiring? Pleasure (for example). Subject it to the rule, throw it into the balance. Ought the good to be such a thing that it is fit that we have confidence in it? Yes. And in which we ought to confide? It ought to be. Is it fit to trust to anything which is insecure? No. Is then pleasure anything secure? No. Take it then and throw it out of the scale, and drive it far away from the place of good things. But if you are not sharp-sighted, and one balance is not enough for you, bring another. Is it fit to be elated over what is good? Yes. Is it proper then to be elated over present pleasure? See that you do not say that it is proper; but if you do, I shall then not think you worthy even of the balance. Thus things are tested and weighed when the rules are ready. And to philosophize is this, to examine and confirm the rules; and then to use them when they are known is the act of a wise and good man.

Discourses, What the Beginning of Philosophy is 142 of 388
Epictetus — The Slave

What "seems" right to each person isn't enough to determine what actually "is" right. We don't just rely on appearances when we weigh things or measure them. We use scales and rulers instead. So why wouldn't there be a higher standard than what merely "seems" right? How could the most important matters in human life have no clear signs and be impossible to figure out? There must be some standard. So why don't we look for this standard, find it, and then stick to it completely? We shouldn't even lift a finger without using it. I think this standard, once we discover it, will cure the madness of people who rely only on what "seems" right and misuse that approach. Then we can start with clear, known principles and apply our sharpened understanding to specific situations.

Discourses, What the Beginning of Philosophy is 141 of 388
Knowing Yourself Doing The Right Thing
Epictetus — The Slave Original

What then "seems" to every man is not sufficient for determining what "is"; for neither in the case of weights nor measures are we satisfied with the bare appearance, but in each case we have discovered a certain rule. In this matter then is there no rule superior to what "seems"? And how is it possible that the most necessary things among men should have no sign (mark), and be incapable of being discovered? There is then some rule. And why then do we not seek the rule and discover it, and afterwards use it without varying from it, not even stretching out the finger without it? For this, I think, is that which when it is discovered cures of their madness those who use mere "seeming" as a measure, and misuse it; so that for the future proceeding from certain things (principles) known and made clear we may use in the case of particular things the preconceptions which are distinctly fixed.

Discourses, What the Beginning of Philosophy is 141 of 388
‹ Previous Next ›

Ancient philosophy, in plain English.

About · Support