Plain
Seneca — The Senator

Another point: even the lowest person can hope to hurt the most powerful. We all have the power to cause trouble. Aristotle's definition is close to mine. He says anger is the desire to pay back suffering. It would take too long to compare our definitions. But you could argue against both of us that wild animals get angry without being hurt first. They don't think about punishing others or making them suffer. Even when they do hurt others, that's not their goal.

On Anger, Book 1, Section 3 Book 1 · 8 of 69
Human Nature Calm Your Mind
Seneca — The Senator Original

In the next place, no one is so low in station as not to be able to hope to inflict punishment even upon the greatest of men: we all are powerful for mischief. Aristotle's definition differs little from mine: for he declares anger to be a desire to repay suffering. It would be a long task to examine the differences between his definition and mine: it may be urged against both of them that wild beasts become angry without being excited by injury, and without any idea of punishing others or requiting them with pain: for, even though they do these things, these are not what they aim at doing.

On Anger, Book 1, Section 3 Book 1 · 8 of 69
Seneca — The Senator

"We often get angry," says our opponent, "not with people who have already hurt us, but with people who are about to hurt us. This proves that anger doesn't come from actual injury." It's true we get angry with those who plan to hurt us. But they are already hurting us with their intentions. Someone who is planning to do harm is already doing it. "Weak people," he argues, "often get angry with powerful people. This proves that anger isn't about wanting to punish your enemy — because people don't want to punish someone when they have no hope of doing it." First of all, I talked about the desire to inflict punishment, not the power to do it. People want things even when they can't get them.

On Anger, Book 1, Section 3 Book 1 · 7 of 69
Human Nature Facing Hardship
Seneca — The Senator Original

"We often are angry," says our adversary, "not with men who have hurt us, but with men who are going to hurt us: so you may be sure that anger is not born of injury." It is true that we are angry with those who are going to hurt us, but they do already hurt us in intention, and one who is going to do an injury is already doing it. "The weakest of men," argues he, "are often angry with the most powerful: so you may be sure that anger is not a desire to punish their antagonist—for men do not desire to punish him when they cannot hope to do so." In the first place, I spoke of a desire to inflict punishment, not a power to do so: now men desire even what they cannot obtain.

On Anger, Book 1, Section 3 Book 1 · 7 of 69
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Ancient philosophy, in plain English.

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