Plain
Epictetus — The Slave

But what if good intentions are the only real good? And what if bad intentions are the only real evil? Then where's the conflict? What would you even fight about? You'd be fighting over things that don't matter to you. And who would you fight with? With people who don't know better — unhappy people who are wrong about what really matters. Socrates remembered this. That's how he managed his household and put up with his very difficult wife and ungrateful son.

Discourses, Against the Quarrelsome and Ferocious 352 of 388
Freedom & Control Human Nature
Epictetus — The Slave Original

But if the will ([Greek: proairesis], the purpose, the intention) being what it ought to be, is the only good; and if the will being such as it ought not to be, is the only evil, where is there any strife, where is there reviling? about what? about the things which do not concern us? and strife with whom? with the ignorant, the unhappy, with those who are deceived about the chief things? Remembering this Socrates managed his own house and endured a very ill-tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful?) son.

Discourses, Against the Quarrelsome and Ferocious 352 of 388
Epictetus — The Slave

What made Eteocles and Polynices enemies? Nothing but their opinions about royal power and exile. They believed one was the worst evil and the other the greatest good. This is human nature: we seek what's good and avoid what's bad. We see anyone who takes away our good or gives us something bad as an enemy and a traitor — even if that person is our brother, son, or father. Nothing matters more to us than what we think is good. So if you believe external things are truly good and evil, then fathers won't be friends to their sons. Brothers won't be friends to brothers. The whole world becomes full of enemies, traitors, and flatterers.

Discourses, Against the Quarrelsome and Ferocious 351 of 388
Human Nature Freedom & Control
Epictetus — The Slave Original

That which made Eteocles and Polynices enemies was nothing else than this opinion which they had about royal power, their opinion about exile, that the one is the extreme of evils, the other the greatest good. Now this is the nature of every man to seek the good, to avoid the bad; to consider him who deprives us of the one and involves us in the other an enemy and treacherous, even if he be a brother, or a son, or a father. For nothing is more akin to us than the good; therefore, if these things (externals) are good and evil, neither is a father a friend to sons, nor a brother to a brother, but all the world is everywhere full of enemies, treacherous men, and sycophants.

Discourses, Against the Quarrelsome and Ferocious 351 of 388
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Ancient philosophy, in plain English.

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