Plain
Epictetus — The Slave

"I'm upset that people pity me," someone says. So is being pitied something that concerns you or the people who pity you? Well, can you stop this pity? I can stop it if I show them I don't need pity. So are you actually in a condition that deserves pity, or aren't you? I think I'm not. But these people don't pity me for things they should pity me for — like my character flaws. Instead, they pity me for my poverty, for not having prestigious jobs, for sickness and death and other things like that.

Discourses, Against Those Who Lament Over Being Pitied 353 of 388
Freedom & Control What Matters Most
Epictetus — The Slave Original

I am grieved, a man says, at being pitied. Whether then is the fact of your being pitied a thing which concerns you or those who pity you? Well, is it in your power to stop this pity? It is in my power, if I show them that I do not require pity. And whether then are you in the condition of not deserving (requiring) pity, or are you not in that condition? I think that I am not; but these persons do not pity me, for the things for which, if they ought to pity me, it would be proper, I mean, for my faults; but they pity me for my poverty, for not possessing honorable offices, for diseases and deaths and other such things.

Discourses, Against Those Who Lament Over Being Pitied 353 of 388
Epictetus — The Slave

But what if good intentions are the only real good? And what if bad intentions are the only real evil? Then where's the conflict? What would you even fight about? You'd be fighting over things that don't matter to you. And who would you fight with? With people who don't know better — unhappy people who are wrong about what really matters. Socrates remembered this. That's how he managed his household and put up with his very difficult wife and ungrateful son.

Discourses, Against the Quarrelsome and Ferocious 352 of 388
Freedom & Control Human Nature
Epictetus — The Slave Original

But if the will ([Greek: proairesis], the purpose, the intention) being what it ought to be, is the only good; and if the will being such as it ought not to be, is the only evil, where is there any strife, where is there reviling? about what? about the things which do not concern us? and strife with whom? with the ignorant, the unhappy, with those who are deceived about the chief things? Remembering this Socrates managed his own house and endured a very ill-tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful?) son.

Discourses, Against the Quarrelsome and Ferocious 352 of 388
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Ancient philosophy, in plain English.

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