Plain
Epictetus — The Slave

So what happens? When we have foolish ideas about things we can't control — when we think these things are good or bad — we end up having to care what tyrants think. I wish people only had to worry about tyrants, not also about the emperor's bedroom attendants. How does a man suddenly become wise just because Caesar put him in charge of the emperor's toilet? Why do we immediately say, "Felicion gave me good advice"? I wish he'd get kicked out of the bedroom, so you could see he's still a fool.

Discourses, How We Should Behave to Tyrants 48 of 388
Freedom & Control What Matters Most
Epictetus — The Slave Original

What then? When absurd notions about things independent of our will, as if they were good and (or) bad, lie at the bottom of our opinions, we must of necessity pay regard to tyrants: for I wish that men would pay regard to tyrants only, and not also to the bedchamber men. How is it that the man becomes all at once wise, when Cæsar has made him superintendent of the close stool? How is it that we say immediately, Felicion spoke sensibly to me? I wish he were ejected from the bedchamber, that he might again appear to you to be a fool.

Discourses, How We Should Behave to Tyrants 48 of 388
Epictetus — The Slave

What actually disturbs and scares most people? Is it the dictator and his soldiers? I hope not. That can't be right. Nothing that is naturally free can be disturbed by anything else or held back by anything except itself. A person's own thoughts are what disturb him. When a dictator says to someone, "I will chain your leg," the person who values his leg says, "Don't do it; have mercy." But the person who values his own will says, "If it seems better to you, chain it." "Don't you care?" "I don't care." "I will show you that I am master." "You cannot do that. Zeus has set me free. Do you think he intended to let his own son be enslaved? You are master of my dead body — take it." So when you approach me, you have no respect for me? No, but I have respect for myself. And if you want me to say I respect you too, I tell you that I have the same respect for you that I have for my pot.

Discourses, How We Should Behave to Tyrants 47 of 388
Freedom & Control Facing Hardship
Epictetus — The Slave Original

What is it then that disturbs and terrifies the multitude? Is it the tyrant and his guards? (By no means.) I hope that it is not so. It is not possible that what is by nature free can be disturbed by anything else, or hindered by any other thing than by itself. But it is a man's own opinions which disturb him. For when the tyrant says to a man, I will chain your leg, he who values his leg says, Do not; have pity. But he who values his own will says, If it appears more advantageous to you, chain it. Do you not care? I do not care. I will show you that I am master. You cannot do that. Zeus has set me free; do you think that he intended to allow his own son to be enslaved? But you are master of my carcase; take it. So when you approach me, you have no regard to me? No, but I have regard to myself; and if you wish me to say that I have regard to you also, I tell you that I have the same regard to you that I have to my pipkin.

Discourses, How We Should Behave to Tyrants 47 of 388
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Ancient philosophy, in plain English.

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