Discourses, On Friendship — In Plain English

Epictetus — The Slave

This ignorance caused the Athenians and Spartans to fight each other. The Thebans fought both of them. The Persian king fought against Greece. The Macedonians fought both sides. The Romans fought the Getae. Even earlier, the Trojan War happened for the same reasons. Alexander was Menelaus's guest. If you had seen how friendly they were, you wouldn't have believed anyone who said they weren't true friends. But then a piece of meat was thrown between them — like between dogs. That meat was a beautiful woman. War broke out over her. Now when you see brothers who seem to be friends and appear united, don't draw any conclusions about their friendship. Don't trust them even if they swear oaths and say nothing could ever separate them. You can't trust the mind of a bad person. It's unstable. It has no reliable principles to guide it. Different temptations overpower it at different times.

Epictetus — The Slave Original

It was through this ignorance that the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians quarrelled, and the Thebans with both; and the great king quarrelled with Hellas, and the Macedonians with both: and the Romans with the Getae. And still earlier the Trojan war happened for these reasons. Alexander was the guest of Menelaus, and if any man had seen their friendly disposition, he would not have believed any one who said that they were not friends. But there was cast between them (as between dogs) a bit of meat, a handsome woman, and about her war arose. And now when you see brothers to be friends appearing to have one mind, do not conclude from this anything about their friendship, not even if they swear it and say that it is impossible for them to be separated from one another. For the ruling principle of a bad man cannot be trusted; it is insecure, has no certain rule by which it is directed, and is overpowered at different times by different appearances.

Epictetus — The Slave

This is why, if you align your self-interest with virtue, holiness, goodness, country, parents, and friends, all of these are protected. But if you put your self-interest in one place and put your friends, country, family, and justice somewhere else, all those good things get crushed under the weight of self-interest. Whatever you identify with — that's where you'll naturally lean. If you identify with your body, that's where your focus goes. If you identify with your will, that's where it goes. If you identify with external things, that's where it goes. Only when I identify with my will can I be the friend, son, and father I should be. Because then it's in my interest to be faithful, modest, patient, self-controlled, helpful, and to honor my relationships. But if I put myself in one place and honesty in another, then Epicurus becomes right when he says either virtue doesn't exist or it's just whatever people think is virtuous.

Epictetus — The Slave Original

For this reason, if a man put in the same place his interest, sanctity, goodness, and country, and parents, and friends, all these are secured: but if he puts in one place his interest, in another his friends, and his country and his kinsmen and justice itself, all these give way, being borne down by the weight of interest. For where the I and the Mine are placed, to that place of necessity the animal inclines; if in the flesh, there is the ruling power; if in the will, it is there; and if it is in externals, it is there. If then I am there where my will is, then only shall I be a friend such as I ought to be, and son, and father; for this will be my interest, to maintain the character of fidelity, of modesty, of patience, of abstinence, of active co-operation, of observing my relations (towards all). But if I put myself in one place, and honesty in another, then the doctrine of Epicurus becomes strong, which asserts either that there is no honesty or it is that which opinion holds to be honest (virtuous).