Plain
Epictetus — The Slave

How does Medea put it? 'I know the evil I'm about to do, but my anger is stronger than my better judgment.' She thought that giving in to her rage and getting revenge on her husband was better than sparing her children. That's how it seemed to her — but she was wrong. Show her clearly that she's wrong, and she won't do it. But as long as you don't show her, what else can she follow except what seems right to her? Nothing else. So why are you angry with this miserable woman for being confused about the most important things? Why has she become like a snake instead of a human being? Why not pity her instead, if you can? We pity people who are blind or lame. Shouldn't we also pity those who are blind and crippled in their most important abilities?

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Human Nature Calm Your Mind
Epictetus — The Slave Original

How says Medea? "'Tis true I know what evil I shall do, But passion overpowers the better counsel." She thought that to indulge her passion and take vengeance on her husband was more profitable than to spare her children. It was so; but she was deceived. Show her plainly that she is deceived, and she will not do it; but so long as you do not show it, what can she follow except that which appears to herself (her opinion)? Nothing else. Why then are you angry with the unhappy woman that she has been bewildered about the most important things, and is become a viper instead of a human creature? And why not, if it is possible, rather pity, as we pity the blind and the lame, so those who are blinded and maimed in the faculties which are supreme?

Discourses, That We Ought not to Be Angry with Men; and What Are the Small and the Great Things Among Men 73 of 388
Epictetus — The Slave

When someone believes something false, understand this: they didn't mean to believe a lie. No one willingly gives up the truth, as Plato says. The false thing just seemed true to them. Now, when it comes to actions, what do we have that's like truth and falsehood? We have right and wrong, helpful and harmful, what fits a person and what doesn't — things like that. Can someone think something is good for them and then not choose it? They can't.

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Human Nature Knowing Yourself
Epictetus — The Slave Original

When then any man assents to that which is false, be assured that he did not intend to assent to it as false, for every soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, as Plato says; but the falsity seemed to him to be true. Well, in acts what have we of the like kind as we have here truth or falsehood? We have the fit and the not fit (duty and not duty), the profitable and the unprofitable, that which is suitable to a person and that which is not, and whatever is like these. Can then a man think that a thing is useful to him and not choose it? He cannot.

Discourses, That We Ought not to Be Angry with Men; and What Are the Small and the Great Things Among Men 72 of 388
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Ancient philosophy, in plain English.

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