But if we read what's written about action — not just to see what it says about action, but to actually act well; if we read about desire and aversion so we can get what we want and avoid what we don't want; if we read about duty so we can remember how things relate to each other and act rationally according to those relationships — then we wouldn't get upset when someone interrupts our reading. We'd be satisfied with doing the right actions. And we'd measure our progress differently than we usually do:
But if we read what is written about action (efforts, [Greek: hormae]), not that we may see what is said about action, but that we may act well; if we read what is said about desire and aversion (avoiding things), in order that we may neither fail in our desires, nor fall into that which we try to avoid; if we read what is said about duty (officium), in order that remembering the relations (of things to one another) we may do nothing irrationally nor contrary to these relations; we should not be vexed, in being hindered as to our readings, but we should be satisfied with doing the acts which are conformable (to the relations), and we should be reckoning not what so far we have been accustomed to reckon: