On Anger, Book 3, Section 26 — In Plain English

Seneca — The Senator

"What then?" you say. "Shouldn't he be punished?" He will be, even if you don't want him to be. The worst punishment for doing wrong is knowing that you did it. No one suffers more than someone tortured by their own guilt. Besides, we should think about all of humanity before we judge what happens in life. It's unfair to blame individuals for flaws that everyone has. A black person's skin doesn't stand out among his own people. No man in Germany is ashamed of his red hair tied in a knot.

Seneca — The Senator Original

“What then?” say you, “shall he not be punished?” He will be, even supposing that you do not wish it: for the greatest punishment for having done harm is the sense of having done it, and no one is more severely punished than he who is given over to the punishment of remorse. In the next place, we ought to consider the whole state of mankind, in order to pass a just judgment on all the occurrences of life: for it is unjust to blame individuals for a vice which is common to all. The colour of an Aethiop is not remarkable amongst his own people, nor is any man in Germany ashamed of red hair rolled into a knot.

Seneca — The Senator

You say, "I can't stand it. Injuries are too hard to bear." But that's not true. If you can bear being angry, how can you not bear the injury itself? Think about what you're actually doing — you're choosing to endure both the injury AND the anger. Why do you put up with a sick person's wild talk? Or a crazy person's ranting? Or when a child hits you? Because they don't know what they're doing. If someone isn't responsible for their actions, does it really matter what made them that way? The excuse of ignorance works the same in every case.

Seneca — The Senator Original

You say, “I cannot endure it: injuries are hard to bear.” You lie; for how can any one not be able to bear injury, if he can bear to be angry? Besides, what you intend to do is to endure both injury and anger. Why do you bear with the delirium of a sick man, or the ravings of a madman, or the impudent blows of a child? Because, of course, they evidently do not know what they are doing: if a man be not responsible for his actions, what does it matter by what malady he became so: the plea of ignorance holds equally good in every case.