Plain
Seneca — The Senator

You can't call something strange or shameful in one person if it's how everyone in his culture acts. The examples I just gave are only defended by the customs of one remote part of the world. But look — there are far worse crimes that deserve more forgiveness because they're found everywhere among all people. We're all quick to anger and careless. We're all untrustworthy, never satisfied, and hungry for power. Why am I trying to soften our shared wickedness with gentle words? We're all bad. Every one of us will find in our own heart the same flaw we criticize in others.

On Anger, Book 3, Section 26 Book 3 · 80 of 121
Human Nature Knowing Yourself
Seneca — The Senator Original

You cannot call anything peculiar or disgraceful in a particular man if it is the general characteristic of his nation. Now, the cases which I have quoted are defended only by the usage of one out-of-the-way quarter of the world: see now, how far more deserving of pardon those crimes are which are spread abroad among all mankind. We all are hasty and careless, we all are untrustworthy, dissatisfied, and ambitious: nay, why do I try to hide our common wickedness by a too partial description? we all are bad. Every one of us therefore will find in his own breast the vice which he blames in another.

On Anger, Book 3, Section 26 Book 3 · 80 of 121
Seneca — The Senator

"What then?" you say. "Shouldn't he be punished?" He will be, even if you don't want him to be. The worst punishment for doing wrong is knowing that you did it. No one suffers more than someone tortured by their own guilt. Besides, we should think about all of humanity before we judge what happens in life. It's unfair to blame individuals for flaws that everyone has. A black person's skin doesn't stand out among his own people. No man in Germany is ashamed of his red hair tied in a knot.

On Anger, Book 3, Section 26 Book 3 · 79 of 121
Human Nature Doing The Right Thing
Seneca — The Senator Original

“What then?” say you, “shall he not be punished?” He will be, even supposing that you do not wish it: for the greatest punishment for having done harm is the sense of having done it, and no one is more severely punished than he who is given over to the punishment of remorse. In the next place, we ought to consider the whole state of mankind, in order to pass a just judgment on all the occurrences of life: for it is unjust to blame individuals for a vice which is common to all. The colour of an Aethiop is not remarkable amongst his own people, nor is any man in Germany ashamed of red hair rolled into a knot.

On Anger, Book 3, Section 26 Book 3 · 79 of 121
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Ancient philosophy, in plain English.

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